Unionism’s Blind Spot: Is English Nationalism a Bigger Threat Than Irish Nationalism?

Charlotte McClay

Ulster Unionist Party leader Mike Nesbitt addressed the party conference at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Belfast, telling party members that English nationalism is now a greater threat to Northern Ireland’s constitutional position than Irish nationalism.

He claimed that while unionists had “looked over their shoulder” at Irish nationalists as the biggest threat to Northern Ireland’s place in the UK, they had been “knocked off the gold medal spot” by English nationalism.

He said:
“Last time I joined our team at Westminster, I was struck by the number of MPs sporting lapel badges not with the flag of the United Kingdom, but the flag of St George. Since then, of course, waving the flag of England has become a campaign for many English people. Like Brexit, they see it as another campaign to ‘take back control’.”

Nesbitt warned that English nationalist MPs may play a serious role in the decrease in funding Northern Ireland will receive from Westminster, controversially arguing that “Our annual subvention, some £19bn, is a very significant sum of money. It could build acute hospitals in the constituencies of English nationalist MPs.”

Although he did not mention Farage’s Reform UK, polls show support is rising rapidly for the right-wing populist party, and Mr Nesbitt warned of the “danger of supporting the sort of right-wing parties other unionists currently find so appealing,” paying homage to both the short-lived 2024 electoral pact between Richard Tice’s Reform and the TUV, and Farage’s subsequent endorsement of DUP candidates Sammy Wilson and Ian Paisley Jr.

But why the rapid U-turn? Unionism has historically defined itself in opposition to Irish nationalism. From the “Home Rule means Rome Rule” campaign of the late 19th century through to the Troubles, unionists saw Dublin as the threat to their national identity, with their strategy relying on support from Westminster, especially from parties seen as protectors of the Union, most famously the Conservatives.

After the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, unionism’s relationship with Westminster entered a new phase, and what had once been built on loyalty and expectation of protection shifted into something more transactional. Power-sharing and the principle of consent embedded in the Agreement meant unionists could no longer rely solely on London to safeguard Northern Ireland’s constitutional position. While the Democratic Unionist Party’s confidence-and-supply deal with Theresa May briefly revived the sense of influence at Westminster, Brexit revealed the fragility of that leverage. Decisions such as the implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol showed that London would prioritise wider English political interests over unionist concerns.

Yet modern English nationalism is a changing political tide, becoming starkly visible during Brexit, with many English voters supporting leaving the EU without much concern for Northern Ireland’s unique position, resulting in the Northern Ireland Protocol, effectively putting a trade border down the Irish Sea — something unimaginable under older unionist assumptions. It revealed that London could and would make compromises about Northern Ireland to serve broader English political aims. In English political discourse, Scotland and Northern Ireland are often discussed in terms of cost or inconvenience.

Unionism has traditionally fought to stop Dublin claiming Northern Ireland, but the 21st-century danger may be Westminster deciding it’s not worth keeping. In that sense, English nationalism isn’t just a bigger threat — it’s possibly the one unionism is least prepared for.